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The Reverberating Risk of Long-Term Care
Allison K. Hoffman*
The Fiftieth Anniversary of Medicare and Medicaid offers an opportunity to
reflect on how American social policy has conceived of the problem of long-term
care. In this essay, I argue that current policies adopt too narrow a conception of
long-term care risk, by focusing on the effect of serious illness and disability on
people who need care and not on the friends and family who often provide it. I
propose a more complete view of long-term care risk that acknowledges how
illness and disability reverberates through communities, posing insecurity for
people beyond those in need of care.
Social insurance programs aim to create greater security for American
families.1 But programs for long-term care have had mixed results. The most
recent attempt at reform, which Ted Kennedy ushered through as a part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),2 was the Community
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act.3 Participation was
optional, which made it actuarially unsound and led to its repeal.4 Medicaid,
which is currently the primary government program to finance long-term care,

*
Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. The author thanks Samuel Bray and
Joanna Schwartz for comments on an earlier draft, Erynn Embree and Lynn McClelland for
research assistance, and Abbe Gluck for the opportunity to present this project at the Yale
Conference on the Law of Medicare and Medicaid at 50. She is also deeply grateful to the many
people who have engaged in valuable conversations about, read drafts of, and supported research
for the larger article on which this essay is based.
1. Social insurance is a term typically used to refer to government programs that spread risk—
for example, Medicare or Social Security—and is what I mean when I use the term “social
insurance” herein. See generally MICHAEL A GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY:
RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE (1999); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., SOCIAL
INSURANCE: AMERICA’S NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND CONTESTED FUTURE (2014). Because these
programs are also redistributive, some argue that they are more like tax and transfer programs than
“real” (meaning private) insurance. This view, however, fails to recognize that all insurance,
whether private or public, redistributes resources from low-risk to high-risk people and from the
lucky to the unlucky. That is the purpose of insurance. Pricing can attempt to diminish such
redistribution by charging risk-rated premiums or to enhance it by charging community-rated
prices. Redistribution of risk to any extent is a defining and critical feature of all insurance. See
James Kwak, “Social Insurance,” Risk Spreading and Redistribution, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, eds., forthcoming
2015).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 8002(a).
4. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 642, 126 Stat. 2313,
2358 (2013).
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has fallen short for people who need long-term services or supports—the care
recipients.5
Even more troublesome is the fact that long-term care policy, especially with
Medicaid’s recent evolution toward home-based care, has intensified a second
type of insecurity for Americans. This insecurity affects people who are
responsible for the long-term care of a loved one.6 Such responsibility results in
staggering costs—both monetary and nonmonetary. The latter include health and
emotional harms as well lost opportunities that are more difficult to measure but
nonetheless significant. In a longer forthcoming article, I explore these costs in
greater detail and make the case for why we should consider these stochastic
harms a collective problem—a social risk—that threatens Americans’ wellbeing
and needs to be addressed. I call this threat “next-friend risk.” 7
Current long-term care social policy ensures heavy reliance on family and
friends. Of course, people have long relied on family for care.8 Yet throughout
the early twentieth century, local and federal governments began to experiment
with systems of long-term care that had the potential to lessen reliance on
families.9 Medicaid emerged as the primary payer for long-term care, largely
displacing other efforts.10 It is worth noting that Medicare only funds long-term

5. This widely-acknowledged shortcoming is what led to the aforementioned CLASS Act and
the creation of a Commission on Long-Term Care by President Barack Obama and the United
States Senate after the CLASS Act was repealed. The Commission’s Report outlines problems
with the current system and recommended solutions. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS (2013). The Commission did not, however, reach consensus, leading to a second set of
recommendations from one-third of the commissioners looking for more comprehensive social
insurance solutions. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LONG-TERM
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2013).
6. Some people respond to this responsibility by paying for care, but most have no choice but
to provide it because they cannot afford to pay for any or all of the necessary care. Two-thirds of
informal caregivers are women. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING IN COLLABORATION WITH AARP,
CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 4 (2009).
7. I borrow the phrase “next friend” from a legal term for a person who in litigation represents
someone with a disability who is otherwise unable to represent himself. Although not a legal
guardian, the next friend protects the interests of an incompetent person. I use this term to
recognize that those responsible for another’s long-term care are sometimes family and sometimes
friends. I also use it instead of “informal caregiver” to imply the possibility that in an ideal world a
next friend might choose to pay for care, rather than to provide it herself.
8. See HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE
AND OLD AGE (2012).
9. At the beginning of the twentieth century, most long-term care needs were met by family,
though some poor and mentally ill people were cared for in almshouses. By the mid-twentieth
century, state institutions for long-term care were built, relying on local and state funding to pay for
care. Subsequently, long-term care shifted to private nursing homes when federal programs began
reimbursing some care provided in these private facilities, but not when provided in public state
institutions. See David B. Smith & Zhanlian Feng, The Accumulated Challenges of Long-Term
Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 29 (2010); Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and
Community Care: Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (2010); see also
EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE SHADOW
OF THE WELFARE STATE (2012).
10. Medicaid and Long-Term Care Services and Supports: A Primer, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1
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care “tangentially,”11 despite the common misconception that it pays for longterm care for older Americans.12
Thus, over the past half century, Medicaid has transformed long-term care
financing. Because Medicaid is means-tested, all but the poorest Americans have
no social insurance for long-term care, with the exception of a small number with
private insurance.13 In turn, most Americans who need long-term care either
“spend down” until they qualify for Medicaid or, more often, rely on family and
friends to help.
Even those who are eligible for Medicaid are increasingly likely to rely on
friends and family. Medicaid initially favored the provision of long-term care in
licensed nursing homes or similar institutional settings, often referred to as
Medicaid’s “institutional bias.”14 Care in such institutions is a mandatory
benefit—one that states must cover to receive federal matching funds.15 In
contrast, in-home personal care (e.g., bathing, dressing, feeding, doing light
housework, shopping for groceries, etc.)16 and “home and community-based
services” are optional benefits.17 States receive matching funds if they offer these
benefits but they are not required to offer them. For some time, states mostly paid
for care in institutional settings.18 But over the past few decades, Medicaid’s bias
toward institutional care has yielded an increased reliance on home and
community-based services, which in most cases just means long-term care at
home. Incentives in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and PPACA in 2010 to
move people from institutional care to home care amplified this trend.19
The move toward long-term care at home offers considerable promise.
People with illness and disability can stay in their homes and live as
independently as possible. The stories of lives transformed when people are
moved from nursing homes into home care are undeniable successes.20 Some

(2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/8617-medicaid-and-long-termservices-and-supports_a-primer.pdf.
11. Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19 HEALTH AFF.
40, 44 (2000).
12. Id. Medicare pays for post-acute care in hospital settings and to a very limited degree in
home settings. Id.
13. KATHLEEN UJVARI, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: 2012 UPDATE
1 (2012) (reporting that 7-9 million Americans hold private insurance policies).
14. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2004).
15. JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40718, LONG-TERM CARE (LTC): FINANCING
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2010). They must also fund home health care for people
who would otherwise be eligible for nursing facility services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(D) (2012).
16. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(24) (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(22) (2012).
18. Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 61.
19. Terence Ng et al., Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Programs: 2010 Data
Update, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-home-andcommunity-based-service-programs.
20. Watson, supra note 9, at 937-38.
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believe that home-based care also saves states money, although the evidence is
mixed on this front.21
On the other hand, Medicaid’s evolving approach cements reliance on family
and friends of people who need care in several ways. First, programs tend to be
underfunded and many have long waiting lists for services.22 Some advocates of
home-based care support it because of its potential as a cost-effective alternative
to institutional care, and are generally resistant to increased public expenditures
for these programs. Second, without the economies of scale that enabled twentyfour-hour care in nursing homes, it is difficult for states to finance the
wraparound care that people might need in a home setting. Finally, as noted
above, the provision of non-medical care, such as bathing or getting dressed, is
an optional Medicaid benefit; that is, states might choose not to cover this care at
all, even as they shift toward home-based care.23 Family and friends often step in
to fill these gaps.
But family and friends can no longer bear such burdens without risking their
own financial stability, emotional stability, health, and general wellbeing. The
world has changed in ways that make de facto reliance on families and friends
increasingly untenable. Care needs are becoming more intensive. Demand for
long-term care has increased as medicine saves people who previously would not
have survived. In 2010, the life expectancy at birth for an American was nearly
79 years,24 ten years longer than it was in the mid-twentieth century and twenty
years longer than at the beginning of the century.25 Heroic trauma care and
miracle drugs are preserving and extending lives of people with serious injuries.26
And the “old old,” defined as those over 80 years old, is growing as a percentage
of the population.27 More Americans suffer from chronic disease than ever

21. See e.g., Andrea Wysocki et al., Long-Term Care for Older Adults: A Review of Home and
Community-Based Services Versus Institutional Care, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. AND
QUALITY (2012), http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/369/1277/CER81_LongTerm-Care_FinalReport_20121023.pdf.
22. Ng et al., supra note 19, at 3.
23. Medicaid Benefits, MEDICAID.GOV (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Benefits/Medicaid-Benefits.html.
24. Sherry L. Murphy et al., National Vital Statistics Reports: Deaths: Preliminary Data for
2010,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
51
(2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_04.pdf.
25. Elizabeth Arias, National Vital Statistics Reports: United States Life Tables 52-53, CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(2007),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_09.pdf.
26. See Andrew I. Batavia et al., Toward a National Personal Assistance Program: The
Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care for Persons with Disabilities, 16 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 523, 523 (1991) (citing studies about the changing nature of disability).
27. Arias, supra note 25, at 44 (of those born in 1900, only 13,529 lived to 80. The number
will more than double for those born in the mid 1900s and will double again for those born in the
early 21st century). But see DONALD L. REDFOOT & ARI HOUSER, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., MORE
OLDER PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY: TRENDS FROM THE NATIONAL LONGTERM CARE SURVEY, 1984-2004 2 (2010) (suggesting that decreasing disability rates have offset
this aging to some degree, so even with a 17% increase in the older population, rates of disability
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before, and the proportion of Americans with chronic conditions is projected to
continue to rise.28
At the same time, families are less able to address the needs of the
chronically ill. The number of single-parent families and two wage-earner
households has increased significantly over the past several decades, leaving
little cushion for unanticipated caregiving needs.29 Families have dispersed
geographically.30 Moreover, the ratio of people needing care to those who might
provide it is increasingly disproportionate, as people live longer and have fewer
kids.31
As a result, the average informal caregiver for a parent who reduces working
hours or leaves the workforce faces monetary losses—foregone income,
pensions, benefits, and retirement savings, including Social Security—of as much
as $200,000 to $300,000.32 Considering that the median household net worth in
the U.S. was just under $70,000 in 2011,33 losses at this level are devastating for
all but the wealthiest households. More than one-third of people caring for aging
parents leave the workforce or reduce working hours, and women are more likely
than men both to become caregivers and to leave the workforce altogether.34

increased only 1.4% between 1989 and 2004).
28. See Gerard Anderson & Jane Horvath, The Growing Burden of Chronic Disease in
America, 119 PUB. HEALTH REP. 263, 267 (2004) (reporting 125 million Americans or 45% of the
population with one or more chronic conditions in 2000 and that prevalence is projected to increase
over the next 30 years). For example, the proportion of informal caregivers reporting to care for
someone with Alzheimer’s Disease or dementia rose from 6% to 12% from 2004 to 2009. NAT’L
ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING IN COLLABORATION WITH AARP, supra note 6, at 41.
29. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 840 tbl.1337 (2012); Howard
N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 4 tbl.1 (1999)..
30. Ping Ren, Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-07.pdf.
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM O’HARE, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE CHANGING CHILD POPULATION
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 4 (2011) (reporting a decrease
in the percentage of the population under age 18 from 40 percent in 1900 to 24 percent in 2010, as
a result of fewer children per family and increased longevity); Emily Brandon, 65-and-Older
Population Soars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:15 AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/01/09/65-and-older-population-soars
(reporting that the proportion of Americans 65 and older has grown from 4.1% in 1900 to 13% in
2012)..
32. METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., THE METLIFE STUDY OF CAREGIVING COSTS TO WORKING
CAREGIVERS: DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR BABY BOOMERS CARING FOR THEIR PARENTS 15 (2011)
[hereinafter METLIFE DOUBLE JEOPARDY] (estimating total loss, including wage, Social Security,
and pensions, of $283,716 for men and $324,044 for women among Baby Boomers caring for their
parents who leave the workforce for any period of time). Some studies estimates are even higher.
METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE JUGGLING ACT STUDY: BALANCING
CAREGIVING WITH WORK AND THE COSTS INVOLVED 5-6 (1999) [hereinafter METLIFE JUGGLING
ACT] (reporting average wage loss of $566,443, Social Security loss of $25,494, and pension loss
of $67,202; median reported wage loss is $243,761).
33. Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/people/wealth
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (follow link to Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011).
34. METLIFE DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 32, at 10.
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Informal caregivers also face significant non-economic costs, including health
and psychosocial consequences.35 For example, research shows that 40 percent to
70 percent of people caring for older adults have symptoms of depression and 25
percent to 50 percent meet the diagnostic criteria for major depression, far
outpacing the rates in the general population.36 And people providing long-term
care for another undoubtedly miss out on the ability to engage in other
relationships or opportunities that bring meaning to their lives. These are, in
effect, the invisible copayment of a long-term care policy.
These costs threaten Americans’ financial, emotional, and physical wellbeing
as seriously as any of the other phenomena that have motivated the creation of
social insurance programs, including unemployment, outliving one’s savings, and
medical spending in retirement. As we think of the next era of reform efforts, we
should consider these costs collectively as posing a social risk—not as a private
problem. This perspective illuminates that next-friend risk could be mitigated
through better long-term care social insurance and suggests at least four
implications for the development of future policy:
1. The Scale of the Problem. Current policy hides costs borne by next friends.
By one estimate, the total costs of informal caregiving in the United States in
2009, if hours were compensated at average care work wages, was $450 billion.37
Accounting for this invisible copayment would require funding at double or triple
its current levels. Such funding is admittedly unlikely, but this sum could anchor
policymakers on a number that more realistically reflects the scale of long-term
care demand.
2. Insurance. Most of us could end up responsible for the long-term care for
another, even if not all of us will. This widespread stochastic harm—plus the
failure of private long-term care insurance markets—makes social insurance an
apt tool to mitigate the impact of this risk. More so, the inability of nearly all
Americans to manage next-friend risk well privately implies that a universal
social insurance program approach like Medicare or Social Security is a better fit
than a means-tested program like Medicaid. Tactically, social insurance policy
more sensitive to next-friend risk could be integrated into existing programs or
could be created as part of a new, freestanding program.38 Politically, seeing the

35. See METLIFE JUGGLING ACT, supra note 32, at 5-6; NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING IN
COLLABORATION WITH AARP, supra note 6, at 47 (2009); ROSALYNN CARTER INST. FOR
CAREGIVING, AVERTING THE CAREGIVING CRISIS: WHY WE MUST ACT NOW 12-13 (2010)..
36. Steven H. Zarit, Assessment of Family Caregivers: A Research Perspective, in 2
CAREGIVER ASSESSMENT: VOICES AND VIEWS FROM THE FIELD: REPORT FROM A NATIONAL
CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 12, 14 (2006) (summarizing studies on informal
caregiving and depression). The rates of major depression in the general population are under 7%.
Major Depression Among Adults, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/major-depression-among-adults.shtml.
37. LYNN FEINBERG ET. AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., VALUING THE INVALUABLE: 2011
UPDATE, THE GROWING CONTRIBUTIONS AND COSTS OF FAMILY CAREGIVING 2 (2011).
38. These ideas are explored further in my forthcoming article.
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problem from the next-friend perspective could make it more relatable for voters
and policymakers, many of whom might worry about the possibility themselves.
This relate-ability might in turn generate support both for increased funding and
improved policies.
3. Flexibility. With or without additional funding, long-term care policies could
be designed more flexibly to better mitigate next-friend risk. When someone
becomes responsible for another, she can provide the care herself, pay for care, or
do some combination of these two. If insurance were designed so that a next
friend could toggle more freely between these choices, she could use benefits to
minimize her own long-term harm, however she might define it. Current policies
do not recognize the need for this toggle. As a result, responses to next-friend
risk are often biased, most often incentivizing a next friend to provide the care
herself. A realistic goal would be to aim to reduce such biases in current policies.
One way to curtail these biases is to create flexible funding, such as a
voucher program in which benefits may be used to pay either a next friend or a
professional care provider. Some programs, including the In-Home Supportive
Services (IHSS) Program in California and the long-term care voucher system in
Germany, are designed with such a toggle. While promising, these programs
reveal how the details of policy design can limit choice, even with a toggle in
place.39 For example, in the IHSS program, household income calculations used
to determine program eligibility include wages a cohabiting family caregiver
earns outside the home, but do not account for IHSS benefits paid to the family
member.40 This means the IHSS benefits paid to a wife to care for her husband
would not disqualify the husband from receiving benefits, but wages from the
wife’s work in a job outside the home likely would. This rule creates a strong
incentive for her to provide care directly, even if doing so threatens her long-term
security. Admittedly, even well-designed vouchers would be layered on
underlying social norms and institutions that have long compelled women to take
on caregiving, even at high personal costs.41 Nevertheless, long-term care
policies could be designed so that they do not reinforce, and perhaps
counterbalance, this gendered bias.
Another way to create flexibility is to invest in better community-based
infrastructure for long-term care. This might take the form of a small-scale group
home or a day care for care recipients, allowing a next friend to go to work and

39. See Joshua M. Weiner & Alison E. Cuellar, Public and Private Responsibilities: Homeand Community-Based Services in the United Kingdom and Germany, 11 J. AGING & HEALTH 417
(1999).
40. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1161(a)(16). Under this same rule, “in-kind support and maintenance” is
not deemed income either.
41. Tomes of scholarship document how social, religious, moral, cultural, and other influences
inscribe caregiving of all kinds as a personal and gendered obligation. A couple of illustrative
examples from different disciplines include BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 10; MARTHA FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2005); HARTOG, supra note 8; JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER (2001). See also Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 18991919 (2000) (describing different feminists schools of thought on caregiving).
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still have time with the care recipient in the evening and on weekends. The next
friend would better be able to balance her career with caregiving, minimizing
impact on her earnings and the long-term harm to her own wellbeing. In the
absence of appealing options for paid care, next friends have little real choice.
Such models exist in experimental form, but should be expanded and replicated
to help mitigate next-friend risk.42
4. Tradeoffs. Finally, taking next-friend risk seriously forces the (admittedly
uncomfortable) question of whether social policy should more intentionally
balance the needs of care recipients and next friends, even if it results in a
solution that is suboptimal for the care recipient in some cases. For example, if an
elderly widower has a stroke, the primary goal of current long-term care law and
policy is to ensure that he has adequate care supports in the least restrictive
setting appropriate.43 If his daughter moves him into her home, as Medicaid
policies increasingly encourage, the widower’s needs could be fully met at the
lowest possible public cost. But his daughter may have to reduce working hours
or leave a secure job with benefits, threatening her family’s long-term finances
and, possibly, her own health and wellbeing. Such results, where each generation
sacrifices its security for the last one, are simply not sustainable.
Long-term care is an elusive problem, both because of its high cost and
because these costs can be hidden as they are passed on to next friends. Seeing
the problem of long-term care from the perspective of next friends reveals its full
complexity. Serious illness and disability have reverberating effects. They create
insecurity not only for the afflicted individual, but also for his or her family and
friends. The next era of social insurance policy for long-term care must grapple
with the reverberations of long-term care risk to create meaningful security for
Americans.

42. For example, On Lok Lifeways provides a mix of at-home, group care, and residential care
to meet an individual’s need. On Lok was developed to help the Asian American community in
San Francisco and formed the basis for a larger Medicaid demonstration program, the Program for
All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly. The Green House Project is another emerging model with small
group homes across the country that are designed so that residents get nursing-home style care but
still feel at home. COMM. ON THE FUTURE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE FOR OLDER AMERICANS BD.
ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., RETOOLING FOR AN AGING AMERICA: BUILDING THE
HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 81-85 (2008).
43. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that institutionalization,
when avoidable, can be a form of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990).

